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330 PEOPLE V. PREWn'T [52 C.~,l 
[Crim. No. 6444. In Bank. June 19, 1959.] 
. THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. HENRY VICTOR PREWITT, 
. . Respondent. 
[1J Prohibition - Application of Rules - Criminal Proceedings-
Accusatory Pleading.-If illegally obtained evidence is the sole 
basis of an indictment or information, defendant is held with-
. out reasonable or probable cause; his lIlotion to set aside the 
accusatory pleading should be granted by the court in which 
he is arraigned on such pleading, and if the 1Il0tion is itu-
properly denied an appellate court will grant prohibition to 
halt proceedings under the accusatory pleading. 
[2] Indictment and Information-Motion to Set Aside-Grounds-
Evidence Illegally Obtained.-Where evidence before the 
magistrate bearing on the issue of illegality of a search and 
seizure is in conflict or susceptible of conflicting inferences 
or consists only of the testimony of prosecution witnesses, 
the court in ruling on a motion to set aside the information 
will frequently not be in a position to make II. final determina-
tion as to the admissibility of the evidence, and accordingly 
the information should not be set aside on the ground that the 
essential evidence was illegally obtaiued if there is any sub-
stantial evidence or applicable presumption to support a con-
trary conclusion, since in such eases the ultimate decision on 
admissibility can be made at the trial on the basis of all evi-
dence bearing on the issue. 
[SJ. Oriminal Law-Preliminary Proceedings - Objections - Evi-
dence.-The burden is on defendant to ..raise the issue of 
illegally obtained evidence, and if the prosecution is by in-
. formation he must object to the introduction of the evidence 
before the magistrate if he seeks to have it excluded as a basis 
for holding him to answer. 
[4J Indictment and Information-Objections-Time of Objection. 
-When the prosecution is by indictment, defendant has no 
opportunity to object to the introduction of evidence before . 
[2] Indictment based on evidence illegally procured, note, 24 
A.L.R. 1432. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Indictment and Information, 
§ 166. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Prohibition, § 44; [2,5,6,13] Indict-
ment and Information, § 88(6); [3] Criminal Law, § 168; [4] In-
dictment and Information, § 84; [7] Arrest, § 5; Searches and 
Seizures, § 19; [8-10, 14, 15] Witnesses, § 60; [11] Arrest, § 12; 
Searches and Seizures, § 21; [12] Arrest, § 12; [16] CriminalI..aw, 
§ 1018. 
) 
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the grand jury, and accordingly there can be no waiver of the 
. right to challenge legality of the evidence to support the in-
dictment based on failure to object to its introduction. 
[5] . ld. - Motion to Set Aside-Grounds - Evidence ruegally 
Obtained.-If the record is silent on the question whether 
essential evidence for an indictment wns illegally obtained, it 
must be presumed that the officers acted lawfully, in which 
case the ultimate decision on admissibility can be made at 
the trial on the basis of all evidence bearing on the issue. 
[8] ld.-Motion to Set Aside-Grounds-Evidence ruegally Ob-
tained.-If the evidence before the grand jury establishes as 
a matter of law that essential evidence was illegally obtained 
or otherwise inadmissible, a Illolion to set aside the indictment 
should be granted. 
[7] Arrest-Without Warrant: Searches and Seizures-Without 
Warrant.-Where there was no direct testimony before the 
grand jury that the officer" making the arrest and seizing the 
evidence in a bookmaking case did not have a warrant, and 
an officer testified that in making the arrest he was acting on 
information received from an informer and the People do not 
contend on appeal that the arrest should he sustained on the 
ground that the existence of n warrant Illust be presumed, the 
only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence 
is that the arrest, search and seizure were made without a 
warrant. 
[8] Witnesses - Privileged Communications - Public Officers.-
When the prosecution seeks to show reasonable cause for a 
search by testimony as to comillunications from an informer, 
known to the officer who received the information, either the 
identity of the informer must be disclosed when defendant 
seeks such disclosure or such testimony must be struck on 
proper motion of defendant. This rule is based on the re-
quirement that the officer fully disclose the information on 
which he relics to enable the court to determine whether it 
constitutes reasonable cause. 
[9] ld.-Privileged Communications-Public Officers.-An officer's 
belief in probable cause for an arrest must or should rest on 
a substantial basis. It is not a question of impugning the 
motives or doubting the honest belief of the officer or agent 
in regard to information he may have received; it is simply 
requiring the witness to sustain his 1Il0tives and his beliefs by 
all the evidence at his command. 
[10] ld.-Privileged Communications-Public Officers.-If an of-
Hcer docs nut kaow the [Jllllle uf :tn informer he does not sup-
[il] Sec Cal.Jur., Witll('s~es, § 31; Am.Jur., Witnesses, §§ 53:;, 
[.36. 
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press evidence by not stating it. Since no privilege is claimed, 
the evidence of the information received cannot be excluded 
on the ground that one is claimed . 
.[11] Arrest-Without Warrant-Reasonable Cause: Searches and 
Seizures-Reasonable Cause.-Evidence of information from 8. 
reliable informer is sufficient to sustain a finding that an 
arrest, search and seizure were made with reasonable cause. 
[12] Id.-Without Warra.nt-Reasonable Cause.-Although infor-
mation provided by an anonymous informer is relevant on the 
issue of reasonable cause, in the absence of some pressing 
emergency an arrest may not be based solely on such informa-
tion, and evidence must be presented to the court that would 
justify the conclusion that reliance on the information was 
reasonable. 
[13] Indictment and Information-Motion to Set Aside-Grounds 
-Evidence IDegally Obtained.-An officer's testimony before 
the grand jury in a bookmaking case that he received a tele-
phone call from a person who told him that a back office opera-
tion was being carried on at a certain apartment and that he 
recognized the voice of this person, who did not give his name, 
as that of a person who had twice previously given him in-
formation that had proved accurate and resulted in arrests, 
and that acting on this information, the source of which he 
considered reliable, he went to the apartmcnt in question, 
obtained a key from the manager's ollice, unlocked the door, 
opened it about two inches, at which point It night latch pre-
vented further progress, whereupon the officers forced the 
latch, entered the apartment and found defendant amid vari-
ous bookmaking equipment, which the officers seized, did not 
establish that essential evidence was illegally obtained, and 
accordingly the trial court erred in setting aside an indictment 
charging defendant with bookmaking and with occupying an 
apartment for the purpose of recording bets. 
[14] Witnesses-Privileged Communications-Public Officers.-It 
cannot be presumed that officers will commit perjury so as to 
justify illegal arrests on the basis of fictitious information 
from fictitious anonymous informers, and it must be presumed 
that trial courts will be alert to detect perjury if it occurs. 
[15] Id.-Privileged Communications-Public 'Officers.-Since the 
privilege of nondisclosure of an informer must be waived 
if the information is to be relied on to prove legality of an 
arrest, the officer to wholU information was given by an in-
former whose identity was allegedly unknown to the officer 
may be cross-examined fully as to facts that might tend to 
identify the infonJler and test the officer's credibility. His 
[12] See Cal.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 10; Am.Jur., Arrest, § 48. 
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tpstimony is not linlited to gt'lleral l<tatements that on previous 
occasions reliable information WIlS ginn, !lnd he cannot claim 
a privilege that the details ,vould tend to identify the informer . 
. [16]. Criminal Law - Judgment - Res Judica.ta..-Dismissal of an 
information or indictment will not bar a trial based on a suh-
sequent accusatory pleading charging the identical offense. 
(Pen. Code, § 999.) This rule specifically applies when the 
previous dismissal was based on the magistrate's conclusion 
that the evidence was illegally obtained; to relitigate the 
question of admissibility of the evidence would not deny de-
fendant due process of law. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los An-
geles County setting aside an indictment. Mark Brandler, 
Judge. Order reversed; motion to augment the record, denied. 
Edmund G. Brown and Stanley Mosk, Attorneys General, 
William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, William B. 
McKesson, District Attorney (Los Angeles), Jere J. Sullivan, 
Lewis Watnick and Robert Lederman, Deputy District At-
torneys, for Appellant. 
Albert Jack Chotiner and Russell E. Parsons for Re-
spondent. 
A. L. Wirin and Paul P. Selvin as Amici Curiae on behalf 
of Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The People appeal from an order granting 
defendant's motion to set aside an indictment charging de-
fendant with bookmaking and with occupying an apartment 
for the purpose of recording bets. (Pen. Code, § 337a.) De-
fendant has moved to augment the record to present addi-
tional grounds for affirming the order. 
The grand jury returned the indictment after hearing the 
following evidence: Officer Joseph Deiro testified that for the 
past three years he had been assigned to the Administrative 
Vice Division of the Los Angeles Police Department and dur-
ing that time had made more than two hundred bookmaking 
arrests. He said that he was familiar with the various ways 
that bookmaking is carried on in Los Angeles. 
A person wishing to make a small bet can place it with a 
"hand book," who is likely to be found in the vicinity of a 
bar or poolroom. One wishing to bet a larger sum can call an 
"agent," who will give him a telephone number to call. 
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The bettor then telephone::; in his bets daily and settles his 
account with the agent about once a week. 
No bookmaker can operate without a system of safely and 
perinallently recording the bets, winnings, and losses. There-
fore most bookmakers have one or more "front offices" or 
"relay spots." At the front office a person answers the tele-
phone and accepts bets placed by the" hand books" and larger 
bettors. He records the bets on the top of a table, a slate, or 
on anything that can be written on and erased or destroyed 
easily, since front offices are often raided by the police. 
The permanent records are kept in the" back office." Just 
before post time of each race the back office calls the front 
office and accepts all bets that have been received by the front 
office. The bets are then recorded on professional betting 
cards and the cards are placed in a rack. These cards con-
tain, in code, the name of the bettor, the horse, the amount of 
the bet, and the result of the race. 
Some time in late January or early February of 1958, 
Officer Deiro received a telephone call from a person who told 
him that a back office operation was being carried on at 248 
South Western Avenue in Apartment 401. This person did 
not give his name, but Officer Deiro recognized his voice as 
that of a person who had twice previously given him informa-
tion that had proved accurate and resulted in arrests. Al-
though Officer Deiro did not know and never had known the 
name of this person, he considered his source of information 
reliable. 
On February 20, 1958, acting upon the information received 
from the informer, Officer Deiro and two fellow officers went 
to the address on South Western Avenue. Officer Deiro ob-
tained a key to apartment 401 from the manager's office. 
The officers slowly unlocked the door to the apartment and 
opened it about two inches, at which point a night latch 
prevented further progress. Nothing but a bare wall could 
be observed through the opening. The officers then forced 
the latch and entered the apartment. Defendant was standing 
in the center of the room amid various bookmaking equipment. 
The officers arrested him and seized the bookmaking para-
phernalia. They found a key to the apartment in defendant's 
pocket. Handwriting analysis indicated that defendant had 
prepared a number of betting cards fOllnd ill a rack in the 
apartment. 
The foregoing evidence before the grand jury was suffi-
cient to support the indictment unless it was illegally ob-
JUlie ] !)~!)] PEOPLE, I). PREWITT 
l52 C,2d 33Q: 3!l P.2d II 
335 
tained. [1] "If ... illegally obtained evidence is the sole 
basis or an indidment or information, defendant is held with-
out reasonable or probable cause; his motion to set aside the 
accusatory pleading should be granted by the court in which 
he is arraigned on such pleading; and if the motioll is im-
properly denied an appellate court will grant prohibition to 
halt proceedings under the accusatory pleading." (People v. 
l'alenti,49 Ca1.2d 199, 203 [316 P.2d 633] ; see also Badillo v. 
Superior COllrt, 46 Ca1.2d 269, 271 [294 P.2d 23] ; Priestly v. 
Superior Court, 50 Ca1.2d 812,815 [330 P.2d 39].) [2] In the 
Badillo case we pointed out that "No problem is presented 
in applying this rule in cases involving searches and seizures 
in which the facts bearing on the legality of the search or 
seizure are undisputed and establish as a matter of law that 
the evidence is or is not admissible. In many cases, however, 
the evidence before the magistrate bearing on this issue may 
be in conflict or susceptible of conflicting inferences or consist 
only of the testimony of prosecution witnesses, and under 
these circumstances the court in ruling on a motion to set 
aside the information will frequently not be in a position to 
make a final determination as to the admissibility of the evi-
dence. Accordingly, the information should not be set aside 
on the ground that essential evidence was illegally obtained 
if there is any substantial evidence or applicable presumption 
to support a contrary conclusion [citations], and in such cases 
the ultimate decision on admissibility can be made at the trial 
on the basis of all of the evidence bearing on the issue." (46 
Ca1.2d at 271-272.) [3] The burden is on the defendant 
to raise the issue of illegally obtained evidence, and if the 
prosecution is by information, he must object to the introduc-
tion of the evidence before the magistrate if he seeks to have 
it excluded as a basis for holding him to answer. (Robison v. 
Supet'ior Court, 49 Ca1.2d ]86, 187 [316 P.2d 1].) [4] When 
the prosecution is by indictment, however, the defendant has 
no opportunity to object to the introduction of evidence before 
the grand jury, and accordingly, there can be no waiver of the 
right to challenge the legality of the evidence to support 
the indictment based on a failure to object to its introduction. 
[5] ,Although lie has 110 opportullit~, to dcvt'lop facts that 
may show that essential evidence was illegally obtained, if the 
record is silent on this question, it must be presumed that the 
offieers aett'd lawfully. (Pfople v. 'fi'ar1'Q1'a, 46 Ca1.2d 265, 
269 [294 P .2d 21].) III snch a case, just as in the case 
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question of legality or no objection is madc to thc cvidence 
seized, "the ultimate decision on admissibility can be made at 
the trial on the ba.~is of all of the evidence bearing on thc 
issue~" (Badillo v. Superior Court, S1tpra.) [6] If, however, 
the evidence before the grand jury establishes as a matter of 
law that essential evidence was illegally obtained or otherwise 
inadmissible, a motion to set the indictment aside should be 
granted. (People v. Valenti, supra.) Defendant contends 
that this is such a case and that the order should therefore 
be affirmed. 
[7] There was no direct testimony before the grand jury 
that the officers did not have a warrant. Officer Deiro testi-
fied, however, that in making the arrest he was acting on the 
information received from the informer and the People do 
not contend that the arrest should be sustained on the ground 
that the existence of a warrant must be presumed. Under these 
circumstances the only reasonable inference that can be drawn 
from the record is that the arrest, search, and seizure were 
made without a warrant. Accordingly, the question presented 
is whether information from an informer who has proved 
reliable in the past constitutes probable cause for an arrest 
when the officer does not know the identity of the informer. 
[8] This question is distinct from that presented in 
Priestly v. Superior Court, SO Ca1.2d 812 [330 P.2d 39]. In 
that case the officer knew the identity of the informer but 
claimed a privilege not to disclose it. It was held that in such 
a ease "when the prosecution seeks to show reasonable cause 
for a search by testimony as to communications from an in-
former, either the identity of the informer must be disclosed 
when the defendant seeks disclosure or such testimony must 
br. struck on proper motion of the defendant." (SO Ca1.2d at 
~19.) This rule is based on the requirement that the officer 
fully disclose the information on which he relies to enable the 
court to determine whether it constitutes reasonable cause. 
[9] "A belief must or should rest upon a substantial basis. 
It is not a question of impugning the motives or douoting the 
honest belief of the agent in regard to the information which 
he may have received. It is simply requiring the witness to 
sustain his motives and his beliefs by all the evidence at his 
command." (United States v. Blich, 45 F.2d 627, 629.) 
(Italics added.) [10] If the officer does not know the name 
of the informer he does 110t suppress evidence by not stating 
it. lIe is not seeking to eat his cake aud have it too; to rely 
on information and yet not reveal it. Since no privilege is I 
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daimed, the evidence of the information received cannot be ex-
cluded on the ground that one is claimed. (See Willson v. 
Superior COUI·t, 46 Ca1.2d 291, 295, footnote [294 P.2d 36].) 
The question remains whether the information should never-
thE' less be held insufficient to constitute reasonable cause. 
[111 Evidence of information from a reliable informer ill 
sufficient to sustain a finding that an arrest, search, and seizure 
were made with reasonable cause. (Willson v. Superior Court, 
46 Ca1.2d 291, 294-295 [294 P.2d 36] ; People v. Boyles, 45 
Ca1.2d 652,656 [290 P.2d 535] ; People v. Dupee, 151 Cal.App. 
2d 364, 367 [311 P.2d 568] ; People v. Dean, 151 Cal.App.2d 
165, 167 [311 P.2d 85] ; Lorenzen v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. 
App.2d 506, 513 [310 P.2d 180]; Trowbridge v. Superior 
Court, 144 Cal.App.2d 13, 18 [300 P.2d 222] ; see 9 Stan. L. 
Re,\". 515, 523-524.) [12] "Although information provided 
by an anonymous informer is relevant on the issue of reason-
able cause, in the absence of some pressing emergency [cita-
tion], an arrest may not be based solely on such information 
[citations], and evidence must be presented to the court that 
would justify the conclusion that reliance on the information 
was reasonable. [Citation.] In some cases the identity of, or 
past experience with, the informer may provide such evidence 
[citation],- and in others it may be supplied by similar infor-
mation from other sources or by the personal observations 
of the police." ( Willson v. Superior Court, 46 Ca1.2d 291, 294-
295 [294 P .2d 36].) In the Willson case, as in this case, the 
informer did not identify himself to the officer, but we held 
that his information together with facts personally observed i 
by the officer were sufficient to constitute reasonable cause for I 
an arrest. Admittedly, an informer's failure or refusal to 
identify himself may cast doubt on the reliability of his infor-
mation, but the fact that his information has proved reliable 
in the past is at least as persuasive of his present reliability as 
'the corroborating suspicious circumstances observed by thn 
officer in the Willson case; circumstances that alone were 
lIot sufficient to constitute reasonable causl". [13] The testi-
mony before the grand jury does not establish that ~<;sential 
evidence was illegally obtained, and accordingly, the trial 
court erred in setting aside the indictment. 
[14] Defendant contends, however, that if reasonable 
cause may be established by information from an informer 
whose identity is unknown to the officer, the rule of the 
-Footnote omitted. 
) 
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Priestly case may be circumventeu by the officer's claiming 
ignorance instead of privilege and the door will be opened 
to justify illegal arrests on the basis of fictitious information 
from fictitiolls anonymous informers, It caunot be presumed, 
bowc\,eJ;, that officers will commit perjury (Lorellzen v. Supe-
rior Court, 150 Cal.App.2d 506, 510 [310 P.2d 180]), and it 
must be presumed that trial courts will be alert to detect per-
jury if it does occur. (See People v. Roberts, 47 Ca1.2d 374, 
378 [303 P.2d 721].) [15] Moreover, since the privilege 
of nondisclosure must be waived if the information is to be 
relied upon, the officer may be cross-examined fully as to I 
facts that might tend to identify the informer and' test the 
officer's credibility. His testimony is not limited to general 
statements that on previous occasions reliable information was 
given, and he cannot claim a privilege that the details would 
tend to identify the informer. His testimony can be elicited 
as to all of the details of the information claimed to have 
been received, and the officer must relate that information to 
actual arrests or investigations made in claimed reliance on it. 
Not only would it be difficult to fabricate such details, but 
since they must be related to actual facts, avenues of investi-
gation to refute them may be opened. In the present case, 
for example, Officer Deiro testified with respect to previous 
information supplied by his informer as follows: 
"Some time in the latter part of 1956, approximately No-
vember or December, I received the first phone call from this 
person who at that time stated, he gave me a telephone num-
ber and told me that bookmaking was being conducted at that 
telephone number and that it was a 'back office.' ... 
"It [the telephone number] was checked out through the 
telephone company and it was registered at 229 North New 
H~mpshire Avenue. An investigation was conducted after 
this information was received, and surveillance disclosed that 
two known bookmakers, whom I had arrested before, were 
entering this location in the morning and leaving in the eve-
ning. Our investigation was conducted for approximately two 
weeks at which time we made an arrest. This particular case 
wcnt to trial; the individuals were held to answer, the case 
was dismissed on a 995 motion, and later on the District 
Attorney's office appealed it, and I have received a subpoena 
this week to testify in Superior Court iu regards to this 
particular case. " 
In People v. Cicchello, ]57 Cal.App.2d 158 [320 P.2d 528], 
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motion to set. aside an information dlargiug Imoklllakiug at 
229 North New Hampshire. We have found 110 olher appel-
late opinion filed between the latter part of 1956 and the date 
Officer Deiro testified in this case involving that address. 
. From the opinion it appears that the arrests were made by 
. Officers Evans and Deiro in February 1957, and that the 
investigation was undertaken on the basis of information 
supplied to Officer Evans who in turn passed it on to Officer 
Deiro. From the record in that case it appears that Officer 
Deiro was asked at the preliminary hearing whether "Prior 
to making this arrest, had you received any information from 
a confidential informant regarding the defendants in this 
caser" He answered, "Myself, personally, no, sir." When 
the present case goes to trial Officer Deiro may be cross-exam-
ined as to whether the arrest he testified to before the grand 
jury was the same arrest described in the Cicchello ('ase, and if 
so, he may be asked to explain the discrepancy in his testimony 
on the two occasions. Of course, if he did not personally 
converse with the informer on the previous occasions referred 
to, he would have no basis for concluding that the informer 
in the present case was the same informer who had proved 
reliable in the past, for it was solely by the sound of the 
informer's voice that Officer Deiro identified him. These 
possible discrepancies were not before the grand jury, ho\v-
ever, and Officer Deiro has had no opportunity to explain them. 
Defendant moved to augment the record on appeal by 
adding thereto the minutes of the Municipal Court of the Los 
Angeles Judicial District in case Number 143900, entitled 
People v. Henry Victor Prewitt, and a certified copy of the 
complaint filed in that court on March 3, 1958, wherein de-
fendant was accused of violating section 337a of the Penal 
Code. In support of the motion defendant has filed an affidavit 
of one of his counsel that the defendant named in the municipal 
eourt action is the defendant in the present case; that the 
charge contained in the indietment in the instant case is 
identical with the charge contained in the complaint filed in 
the municipal court; and that after a preliminary examination 
at which substantially the same evidence was presented to the 
magistrate as was presented to the grand jury, "said case 
was dismissed by reason of the fact that the evidence had 
been unlawfully obtained, in violation of the rules laid down 
in tIle case of People v. Cahan, 44 CIl1.2d 434 [282 P.2d 905, 
50 A.L.R.2d 513]." 
[16] Def"lldant contends that the doL'trines of res judi-
340 PEOPUl 11. PREWITT [52 C.2d 
cata and collateral estoppel arc applicable to establish that 
the evidence in the present case was unlawfully obtained. The 
dismissal of an information or indictment, however, will not 
bar a trial based on a subsequent accusatory pleading charging 
the identical offense. (Pen. Code, § 999; Ex Parte Fenton, 
77 Cal. 183 [19 P. 267] ; People v. Joseph, 153 Cal.App.2d 
548 [314 P.2d 1004] ; see also In re Begerow, 136 Cal. 293, 
298-300 [68 P. 773, 56 L.R.A. 528] ; People v. Beltran, 94 Cal. 
App.2d 197, 203-205 [210 P.2d 238].) This rule specifically 
applies when the previous dismissal was based on the magis-
trate's conclusion that the evidence was illegally obiained. 
(People v. Joseph, supra, 153 Cal.App.2d 548; see also 
Badillo v. 8upe,.wr Court, 46 Ca1.2d 269, 272-273, footnote 
[294 P.2d 23].) There is no merit in defendant's assertion i 
that to relitigate the question of the admissibility of the evi-
dence denies him due process of law. (People v. Ferrera, 149 
Cal.App.2d 850, 852 [309 P.2d 533].) 
The motion to augment the record is denied. The order 
setting aside the indictment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., and Peters, J., con-
curred. 
Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred in the judgment. 
